Australian and New Zealand research on the economics of natural resource management (NRM) has a relatively short history. Defining NRM as including water, fisheries, agricultural land, nature conservation and forestry, 65 per cent of all Australasian journal articles in the area have been published since 2005. The most researched NRM issue is water, followed by fisheries and agricultural land. Most of the NRM issues with a high level of economic research are issues that have had major policy initiatives in place at around the time of the studies, highlighting the high policy relevance of most of the research. For each NRM issue, we identify important contributions that have been made by Australian economists. These include the design and implementation of well-functioning water markets, the provision of strong critiques of agricultural NRM programs, advice on the design and implementation of individual transferable quotas for fisheries and many more.
Introduction
Commencing in the 1980s, management and conservation of natural resources (including land, fish, water and habitat) attracted growing policy and researcher attention in Australia, leading to an evolving set of national policy programs with investment of billions of dollars (Hajkowicz 2009; Lee and Ancev 2009) . The philosophies, strategies, mechanisms and priorities of these programs have varied, and assessments of performance have reached mixed conclusions.
Australian and New Zealand economists working on these issues have made many important contributions. We have often provided cogent critiques of weak current policies and suggested practical solutions. We have worked closely with policy and management agencies, and also with other research disciplines, providing a framework for integration of information to inform decision-making. Management of natural resources has benefited from the implementation of programs based on economic principles.
In this paper, we have two aims: (i) to summarise the level of research effort by economists in Australia and New Zealand on issues of natural resource management, looking at how that effort has varied over time in quantity and in allocation to different NRM issues; and (ii) to identify key contributions that economists have made in each area of natural resource management.
Patterns and emphases of research
Our first aim was to identify trends in Australian published research on the economics of NRM. We used the following procedure:
1. Define the scope of NRM to include management and conservation of land, water, marine resources, biodiversity and forests. Excluded were research on climate change and carbon sequestration, mining and environmental valuation. 2. Identify articles within that scope published in the Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, the Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics and the Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, from 1952 to 2015. 3. For Australian or New Zealand authors with at least two articles from step 2, use Scopus to identify additional relevant articles that they have co-authored.
This process identified 634 papers, almost all in journals. In later sections of the paper where we identify key contributions, we include all types of publications, including conference papers, government reports and books. Figure 1 and Tables 1-5 provide an overview of levels and relative emphases of Australian and New Zealand research on the economics of NRM since 1952. In the first three decades of the period, there was an average of less than one paper per year (Figure 1 ). From 1995, output grew rapidly, averaging 35 papers per year over the past decade. Almost two-thirds of all papers in the study set were published between 2005 and 2015. Most of the growth occurred in journals other than the three associated with the Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society. Table 1 shows a breakdown of this body of research into subfields. The largest subfield by far was water. At the other extreme, forestry and nature conservation had very few publications. (See Supporting Information for a graph of numbers of publications in these subfields over time.)
In agriculture (Table 2) , the main issues researched were soil salinity, soil conservation, land use and herbicide resistance. Notably, there was a boom in research into salinity in the 2000s, corresponding with a major national policy and the availability of significant research funding.
In fisheries (Table 3) , the main issues researched were the economic performance or efficiency of various fishing strategies, individual transferable quotas (ITQs), marine reserves and governance. ITQs became a prominent policy issue in the 1990s, whereas the research on marine reserves has been conducted almost entirely over the past decade -a time when it has been a prominent policy and political issue.
The most prominent issues researched in water economics (Table 4) have been water markets, issues related to irrigation, river salinity, water quality more generally, environmental water and issues related to community attitudes and behaviour. The dramatic growth in research on the economics of water after 2005 corresponds with a period of intense politics and policy development, no doubt fed in part by the millennium drought. Water markets and water rights are easily the most researched issue related to the economics 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Axis Number of Australian NRM papers published of NRM in Australia, reflecting the country's reputation as a world leader in the implementation of water markets. In subsequent sections, we switch focus to identifying the main contributions of economists working on NRM. These contributions are presented in the context of contemporary developments and policies (See Supporting Information for contributions from cross-cutting papers, which are omitted from the paper for space reasons.).
Water
Prior to the 1970s, the dominant focus of water policy in Australia was to develop, expand and support profitable irrigated agriculture. After the 1970s, there was growing awareness of the impacts of water use for irrigation on the aquatic environment, including concerns about toxic blue-green algal blooms and salinity. Over time it came to be accepted that state governments had overallocated water licences to farmers. Musgrave (2008) described how economists (notably Bruce Davidson 1969) initially had great difficulty convincing the public and water agencies that ongoing expansion of irrigation was not in the public interest. Our eventual success in doing so was a major contribution to the Australian community. Central to the reforms that followed was the establishment of a market for water within the Murray-Darling Basin (Crase et al. 2004) . Relevant research included studies that clarified the definition of property rights for water (Randall 1981; Brennan and Scoccimarro 1999; Heaney and Beare 2001; Freebairn and Quiggin 2006) , the unbundling of property rights to land and water (Bjornlund and O'Callaghan 2004) , and the interaction between water markets and environmental outcomes (Connor and Perry 1999) . The guidance of economists was central to the decision to establish a market, the creation of necessary institutions (Cummins and Watson 2012) and the design and implementation of market-related processes, including metering. Much of the input of economists occurred within the responsible organisations, such as the Murray-Darling Basin Commission, and sometimes in public debates, rather than through the pages of academic journals.
There are a number of overviews of the long process of water market development (e.g. Musgrave 2008; Rolfe 2008; National Water Commission 2011; Cummins and Watson 2012) . These make it clear that the process of reform has been challenging intellectually and politically. Rolfe (2008) identifies three challenges for economists: the problem of deciding much water extraction to allow, especially when prices do not reflect the real economic value of water; the problem of initiating and designing the market trading system, especially where private property rights have to coexist with common property rights, or where there are substantial uncertainties; and the problem of imposing constraints on the system to limit potential market failure problems and account for sustainability. Cummins and Watson (2012) highlight a number of costly government failures at various points in the process, including the 4 per cent limit on trade of water out of Victoria, and the excessive reliance on infrastructure investment to generate water savings. The latter strategy has recently been politically popular as an alternative to purchasing water from farmers, despite criticisms of its costliness and questions about its effectiveness at actually saving water (Gyles 2011) . Nevertheless, the benefits flowing from the establishment of water markets have certainly been large -hundreds of millions of dollars per year, according to the National Water Commission (2011). Beyond issues of markets and irrigation, the other main group of studies on the economics of water have focused on the environment: river salinity, other aspects of water quality and the allocation of water to environmental outcomes. In this area, there has been some strong criticism from economists about the success and cost-effectiveness of government investments (e.g. Lee and Ancev 2009; Pannell and Roberts 2010) . Economic research into river salinity peaked in the 2000s, at the same time as research into soil salinity, both being targets for the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality (NAP) from 2001. River salinity had previously been targeted by a Salinity and Drainage Strategy of the Murray-Darling Basin Commission in 1989, and the Basin Salinity Management Strategy in 2001. These strategies were much more successful at reducing river salinity than was the NAP, primarily because they relied on engineering approaches, whereas the latter relied on land-use change. Key economic research on river salinity included studies of the interaction between salinity and water use for irrigation (e.g. Nordblom et al. 2006; Adamson et al. 2007) , and the interaction between river salinity and water markets (e.g. Connor et al. 2008a ).
There has also been economic research on other aspects of water quality, particularly nutrients and sediment. In Australia, concerns about the Great Barrier Reef have been a prompt for policy initiatives, motivating a range of economics research (e.g. Greiner and Miller 2008) . Other Australian work has looked at nutrients and sediment in rivers or lakes (Roberts et al. 2012) . In New Zealand, water quality in inland water bodies has become a major concern of policy over the past decade, again supported by a range of economic studies (e.g. Cullen et al. 2006; Kerr and Lock 2010) . A message from some of this work is that improving water quality through changes in land management within the relevant catchment can be very costly, so that policy targets need to be considered carefully to ensure that they are feasible and worthwhile.
Finally, an element of Australian policy has been the acquisition of water rights for environmental purposes (Lane-Miller et al. 2013) . The Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder (CEWH) is now the largest holder of water rights in Australia. As at 31 May 2016, the CEWH had holdings totalled 2 400 000 ML of registered entitlements with a long-term average annual yield of 1 700 000 ML (https://www.environment.gov.au/node/18963 accessed 19 July 2016). Economists have researched a number of different aspects of environmental water, including the opportunity costs to irrigators (e.g. Scoccimarro et al. 1997; Wheeler et al. 2014) , and strategies for acquiring water (e.g. Qureshi et al. 2007) . We observe that, while economists have assisted governments to acquire environmental water efficiently (by our support for water markets), concerns have been expressed about the capacity of government to allocate this water well. There is scope for economists to make greater contributions to these allocation decisions.
Agriculture
Prior to the 1980s, the focus of agricultural policy was to develop the industry. There were few Australian or New Zealand papers on the economics of agricultural NRM. An early landmark was The Northern Myth by Bruce Davidson (1965) , which highlighted the follies of poorly considered agricultural development in the north of Australia. His insights were sharp and still have relevance as northern agricultural development is again a policy issue.
Interest in the economics of soil degradation and soil conservation in Australia grew in the 1990s, coinciding with the creation of the National Landcare Program. During this period, Jack Sinden at the University of New England publishing work on a range of related issues, including community support for conservation, the influence of conservation on farm land values (King and Sinden 1988 ) and the damage costs of land degradation (Sinden et al. 1990) .
A key contribution of papers published in this era was to introduce some economic realism into a debate that was otherwise somewhat idealistic and/or politicised (e.g. Chisholm and Dumsday 1987) . Notable in this respect was Tony Chisholm's Presidential Address for AARES in 1991 (Chisholm 1992) , the Society's first presidential address to focus primarily on NRM. Chisholm pointed out that, despite widely expressed concerns about soil erosion, Australian agriculture had achieved favourable productivity growth over the previous four decades.
Another important contribution to increasing realism came from studies on adoption of NRM practices by farmers (e.g. Cary and Wilkinson 1997; Pannell et al. 2006) . These highlighted that adoption of NRM practices is a complex and multifaceted issue but that the economic motivations of farmers are a crucial element.
Pannell identified that Landcare and other related programs had an overreliance on extension to promote land conservation practices to farmers and developed a widely used framework to assist managers and policymakers identify the most appropriate mechanism (including extension) for encouraging land-use change (Pannell 2008) .
Following widespread adoption of zero tillage by crop farmers, concerns about soil conservation diminished somewhat, and its prominence as a topic of research by economists also decreased. However, it was replaced in the 1990s and 2000s by soil salinity and herbicide resistance.
There had been some research on the economics of soil salinity in the 1980s (e.g. Greig and Devonshire 1981) , but this effort grew substantially in the 1990s and 2000s, reflecting the high public profile of salinity, the creation of the NAP in 2001 and the availability of dedicated research funding from certain funders.
Various researchers studied the farm-level economics of particular salinity management practices (e.g. Jones and Marshall 1992; Cacho et al. 2001; Kingwell et al. 2003) . A key message from this research was that, in many locations, the available farming practices for mitigating salinity were not sufficiently profitable to attract sufficient adoption by farmers to effectively address the problem. Romy Greiner's catchment modelling research for the Liverpool Plains in New South Wales (e.g. Greiner 1998) was the largest body of salinity economics research prior to the escalation of salinity as a policy issue. She showed that internalisation of the salinity externality changed farm management significantly. This contrasted with the work of in Western Australia, who found that internalising salinity externalities would have little impact on farm management, indicating that the extent of market failure was minimal.
Following the perceived success of water markets in Australia, salinity was used as a vehicle for experimenting with market-based policy instruments, in the NAP. However, these experiments were peripheral to the national policy and the various state policies. The core of the approach used in all cases was an evolution from the Landcare Program of the 1990s, with a dominant reliance on extension and volunteerism. Pannell (2001) argued that the existing programs were poorly designed; they needed to adopt a more targeted and evidence-based approach to land-use change and to invest in technology development. This critique influenced the establishment of the Cooperative Research Centre for Plant-Based Management of Dryland Salinity and may have contributed to a subsequent decline in the political priority of salinity.
After salinity, the next most researched NRM issue by Australian economists in the 1990s and 2000s was herbicide resistance. Although this is a national issue (and indeed an important international issue), the economic research was predominantly in Western Australia, with all 21 published journal articles coming from that state, under the leadership of David Pannell. Many of the publications in this body of work evaluated particular systems or strategies for managing or delaying herbicide resistance (e.g. Doole and Pannell 2008) . A key finding was that pre-emptive actions to prevent the onset of herbicide resistance are not economically beneficial to farmers in most cases (Pannell and Zilberman 2001) , except in the case of glyphosate (Weersink et al. 2005) . Once resistance has occurred, the economics strongly favour substantial changes in weed management (e.g. Monjardino et al. 2004 ). An important contribution was the development of the Resistance and Integrated Management (RIM) model , which has been used by thousands of farmers to test resistance management strategies, and remains actively maintained and supported (Lacoste and Powles 2014) .
Fisheries
Australian fisheries economists have demonstrated positive net benefits from managing fisheries to economic objectives, rather than according to biological thresholds (e.g. Norman-Lopez and Pascoe 2011; Grafton et al. 2012) . Early policies for fisheries management in Australia tended to rely on input controls, including entry restrictions in the Western rock lobster fishery in 1963 (Meany 2011) and in the northern prawn fishery in 1977 . However, these programs promote inefficient levels of investment in unregulated inputs (Kompas et al. 2004) . 'Buyback schemes' have been used try to reduce fishing capacity (Grafton and Nelson 2007) , but recent research has shown that in some cases they can increase fishing pressure through removing the least efficient operators first (e.g. Pascoe et al. 2012) .
From the mid-1980s, rights-based management was adopted more quickly in Australasia than in most countries. An individual transferable quota (ITQ) scheme was established for the southern blue fin tuna fishery in 1984 (Kennedy and Watkins 1985) , while New Zealand became the first country to adopt ITQs as national policy in 1986 (Doole 2005) . Subsequent studies for ITQs in the region have had a number of key challenges, including incentives to discard bycatch (Pascoe et al. 2010) , consideration of indigenous take (van Putten et al. 2013) , potential consolidation of harvesting firms (Abayomi 2012) and potential for stock collapse if population assessments are incorrect (Campbell et al. 1993; Doole 2005) .
Another mechanism of interest in recent years has been area closures. Sizing and locating these areas is subject to high uncertainty and complexity, but it has been shown that they can improve the stability and level of fishery profit (Grafton et al. 2009 ), particularly when there are substantial spillovers to adjacent fisheries (Yamazaki et al. 2010) and when stocks are severely depleted (Buxton et al. 2014) . However, some research indicates that achieving such benefits is not straightforward (Greenville and MacAulay 2007; Abecasis et al. 2015) , perhaps explaining ongoing opposition to marine reserves by industry. On the other hand, the ecological and tourism benefits of marine reserves can be large (Kragt et al. 2009; Vianna et al. 2012) .
The need to consider the holistic context of fisheries management is now recognised; delivering benefits from conserved ecosystems and enhanced livelihoods 'requires much more than preventing overfishing' (Grafton et al. 2008; p. 630) . For example, it needs an understanding of stakeholder goals for management (e.g. Pascoe et al. 2009) . Taking this need seriously, an attempt was made at self-governance within the New Zealand fishing industry, but this met limited success due to high transaction costs associated with selforganisation (Townsend 2010) .
Australian economists have played a pivotal role in the development and application of economic theory in the context of fishery management. Overall, the patterns of research that are observed are driven in response to practical problems, but are influenced by international trends. A key example is the focus on rights-based management over the last twenty years. There is increasing recognition that single policy mechanisms will seldom be sufficient to meet societal goals in wild fisheries, given the inherent complexity of marine ecosystems (Yamazaki et al. 2015) .
Forestry
The harvest of native and plantation forests has received less attention from economists than other larger primary industries, such as agriculture and mining. Important research includes work on regional and national development (Johnson 1985) , conflict between stakeholders (Ananda and Herath 2003) , biodiversity (Lindenmayer et al. 2015) , threats posed by fire (Spring et al. 2008 ) and the social context of forest management (Dare et al. 2011) .
Australia and New Zealand maintain important agricultural industries that have off-site impacts. The planting of native and exotic forests is a key mitigation strategy for offsetting many of these losses (e.g. salinity, sediment, carbon). Consistent attention has been paid to the external benefits resulting from the establishment of these forests. These include the utilisation of forests to reduce salinisation rates (Nordblom et al. 2010) , provide habitat for endangered fauna (Spring and Kennedy 2005) , reduce nutrient and sediment loss from land , provide for recreational and tourism values (Dhakal et al. 2012) , and offset greenhouse gas emissions (Polglase et al. 2013) . Nevertheless, recent work also highlights the need to consider the detrimental off-site impacts of plantation forests, such as declines in water yield (Nordblom et al. 2015) .
Nature conservation
Private landholders manage more than half of the land areas of Australia and New Zealand, with broadscale clearance of land being widely promoted by early government policy focused on economic development in both countries. The clearance of indigenous forest on this land has had profound effects on the environment, but especially on biodiversity (Lindenmayer et al. 2012) , so conservation of native vegetation has been an ongoing interest of economists (e.g. Tisdell 1985) .
Over the past 25 years, a significant proportion of environmental expenditure in Australia has been allocated to farmers for conservation activity, including actions to protect biodiversity (Connor et al. 2008b) . In many cases, grants to farmers were set at standard rates for particular practices, raising the likelihood that some payments were inefficiently high. Efforts to negotiate efficient payment rates would likely be hampered by asymmetric information between farmers and agencies regarding the true costs of biodiversity conservation (Stoneham et al. 2003) . This recognition stimulated a major effort to test and establish market-based instruments (particularly conservation tenders) as an efficient approach for achieving biodiversity conservation (Doole et al. 2014) . Indeed, Australia has played an important role as a testing ground for the use of market-based instruments for biodiversity conservation. Early groundwork was laid by Mike Young's team at CSIRO (Binning and Young 1999) , Bardsley (2003) and Cason and Gangadharan (2004) , and subsequent important work included Windle and Rolfe (2008) , Whitten et al. (2013) , and Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann (2013) .
Research has demonstrated that there are benefits in the targeting of conservation investments (Polyakov et al. 2015) , reinforcing the benefits of using conservation tenders. Nevertheless, the use of conservation tenders peaked around 2010-2011 and has since fallen, probably due to their need for continued investment, perceived high transactions costs, low participation rates in many cases, dissatisfaction with assessment metrics, the scarcity of people experienced in their design and implementation, and concerns about the potential for crowding out of private investment (Blackmore and Doole 2013) .
There remains potential for broader application of economic principles in nature conservation. However, there are inherent difficulties with doing so, particularly with respect to the development of objectives for management, the assessment of benefits and costs, and delineating the impacts of management. This may partly explain the relatively small number of publications by economists in this area. Interestingly, the neglect of this area by economists (other than the work on market-based instruments) appears to have resulted in ecologists stepping in to undertake much research with an economic dimension to it, particularly ecologists associated with Hugh Possingham at the University of Queensland (e.g. Carwardine et al. 2010; Wilson et al. 2010; Possingham et al. 2012 ).
Conclusion
Economists have made major contributions to the management of natural resources in Australia and New Zealand over the past 25 years or so. The establishment of a successful water market in the Murray-Darling Basin (and smaller markets elsewhere) and the introduction of individual tradeable quotas for various fish stocks stand out as clear examples where the application of economic ideas and specific research has generated major benefits. Within agriculture, economic research has positively influenced management and policy in a number of areas, including soil salinity and soil conservation.
Nevertheless, in many aspects of natural resource management, economics has not been as influential as it could have been, partly due to a lack of economics expertise in the sector (Seymour et al. 2008) . In some cases, conservation-minded stakeholders are actively opposed to the consideration of economics in decision-making (Rogers et al. 2015) . But it is also beholden on economists to undertake research that is highly relevant to current issues, to address the specific questions of managers and policymakers, to communicate the results widely and well, and to collaborate well with stakeholders and other disciplines. There are, of course, plenty of examples where these things occur, but also examples where they do not. In all of the areas reviewed here, there are many important research gaps remaining, so we expect to see NRM continue to be the subject of active economic research.
A related study, focussing on American research on natural resource economics, was undertaken by Lichtenberg et al. (2010) . Although somewhat different in scope and approach, like us they observed a research agenda driven by policy, an interdisciplinary orientation and an emphasis on quantitative analysis. Interestingly, of the three long-standing and pressing challenges they identified, two have been amongst the success stories in Australia and New Zealand: the design of institutions for managing water resources and management of fisheries.
